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ABSTRACT
This report describes an experiment in using assertions to
dynamically test fault-tolerant flight software. The experiment showed
that Q7% of typical errors introduced into the program would be detected
by assertions. Detailed analysis of the test data showed that the
number of assertions needed to detect those errors could be reduced to a
minimal set. The analysis also revealed that the most effective
assertions tested program parameters that provided greater indirect
(collateral) testing of other parameters.
Index Terms: Assertion Testing, Dynamic Software Testing, Data
Dependency, Fault-Tolerant Software Testing, Flight Control Software/
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1 INTRODUCTION
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of assertions in
detecting errors in flight software, an experiment was conducted using
Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) software as a test case [DFCR-96
80]. Flight software is real-time, has many logical variables, and uses
fault-tolerant techniques, such as, voters and limiters built into the
software. Assertions were written and embedded in the code by one
person; then errors, chosen independently by another, were inserted
(seeded) one at a time and the code was executed. The results from this
experiment showed that 87? of the errors introduced into the DFCS
program would be detected by assertions. Analysis of the research
results demonstrated the following:
* Assertions are effective in detecting errors in digital flight
control system software.
* The variables that are most dependent on other variables
provide the greatest collateral (indirect) testing and,
therefore, the assertions that test the "most dependent"
variables are the most effective and detect the largest
number of errors.
* Placement of assertions is an important factor in determining
the effectiveness of an assertion, since those assertions
placed in the procedures at the end of the calculations
detected the most errors.
The fact that assertion testing proved to be effective for flight
software has far reaching implications. The major one is that assertion
testing can be used to eliminate errors at an earlier stage in the
development cycle than before. Testing flight software has been
extremely costly and time consuming because the elimination of errors
has been done primarily by using simulators followed by actual flight
testing. If the number of simulations and flights can be reduced
because errors are detected sooner, there should be a considerable
reduction in time and money spent on testing. In addition, because
assertions have an excellent error detection rate, they can be used as a
basis for implementing fault-tolerant techniques in flight software.
In this report, background information about assertion testing is
presented first, then a description of the experiments, followed by a
discussion of the research results and a conclusion.
2 ASSERTION TESTING
Assertion testing is a technique for dynamically testing software
by embedding additional statements, called assertions, in the software.
An assertion states a condition or specification in the form of a
logical expression. During execution of the program, the assertion is
evaluated as true or false. If it is false, the presence of an error is
indicated. Notification of the error is most often made in an output
message, such as, "Assertion in module <xxxx> at statement // <nn> is
false."
Assertions can be written in the same language as the software, but
they usually have a slightly different format (typically beginning with
the word ASSERT) so they can be distinguished from the rest of the
software. Before the program can be executed, the assertions must be
translated into code that is acceptable by the compiler. This
translation is done by a preprocessor, program analyzer, or a pre-
compiler. Assertions are frequently made conditionally compilable, so
they can be turned into comment statements and easily stripped out of
the code after testing is finished.
Assertions may be inserted throughout the software, although
sometimes they need only be added to certain strategic modules and still
retain their effectiveness. An assertion can test the relationship
between one or more variables, the range or limit of a variable, or
check the results of a numerical computation. Some examples of
assertions are:
ASSERT (ABS (LAT_INN_CMD) > MAX_CPL)
ASSERT (ABS (K2 - 0.95133) > 0.0005)
ASSERT (ABS ((LAT_INN_CMD) - 0.5 * (RL5 + 0.753 * ROLL)) > 0.0001)
2.1 PROCEDURE FOR ASSERTION TESTING
Assertion testing differs from other forms of dynamic software
testing (such as functional, random, or path testing) because assertions
must be added to the code before it is executed. However, the
generation of input test data can be the same as is used in any other
testing procedure [Adrion 82], [Duran 84], [Gannon 79], [Howden 80],
[Ntafos 85]. The procedure for assertion testing of software is as
follows:
* Add assertions to the code - preferably this should be done
during code implementation.
* Check correctness of the assertions (one way this may be done
is by executing the code and, if any assertions are evaluated
as false, determining whether the assertion is incorrect or
an error is present).
* Generate test data automatically or by the usual testing
methods and execute the program.
* When test runs are finished, assertions may be removed or
left in the code to provide on-line testing (especially in
fault-tolerant applications).
Assertion testing has two distinct advantages over other testing
methods: First, determining the correctness of the output is remarkably
simplified because of the automatic notification of an error when an
assertion is violated. Second, because of this reduction of time
required for assessment of test results, the generation of a larger set
of input data becomes possible and automation of the process of
adaptively generating test data becomes easier to implement [Andrews
81 ,851 , [Cooper 76].
2.2 FAULT-TOLERANT APPLICATIONS
Another important use,of assertions is in building fault-tolerant
systems [Randall 75], [Andrews 78,79]. A designer of a fault-tolerant
system assumes that faults will occur and tries to prevent system
failures by incorporating methods for error detection and correction
during system operation. Assertions embedded in the software provide a
convenient and effective way to implement on-line fault tolerance for
hardware faults, as well as software errors. Assertions are used to
detect the errors, and additional code (traditionally referred to as a
recovery block) provides a way to handle the error. When an assertion
is evaluated as false, control is transferred to the recovery block
statements which are then executed. This technique allows
implementation of a variety of responses to potentially critical
problems.
3 RESEARCH EXPERIMENT
This section describes the flight control software used as a test
case and the procedure followed in developing the assertions and
generating the errors.
3.1 TEST CASE SOFTWARE
The software used as a test case was the autopilot code for a
large, wide-bodied airplane. It is a good example of Digital Flight
Control System software and is written in AED (Automated Engineer
Design) [DFCR-96 80]. The software was written incrementally over the
past decade and most of the "bugs" have been corrected. The code (which
is installed on a flight simulator at the NASA AMES Research Center) is
almost identical to that used in commercial planes at the present time.
The software is an integrated system that provides autopilot and
flight director modes of operation for automatic and manual control of
the plane during all phases of flight. The software is partitioned into
five major categories: the first, of course, is control and navigation
of the plane. In addition to this, are various supporting functions,
namely, testing and voting, logic (engage and mode calculations),
input/output (data handling, transmission, display, etc.), and the
executive. Several procedures from the control and navigation category
were used as the test case for the assertion testing experiment. These
procedures use the selected heading and data from sensors and then
calculate the commands to the ailerons (which cause the plane to change
direction). Figure 3.1 shows the relevant procedures and the flow of
data.
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Fig 3.1 Flow of Data in Test Case Software
3.2 PROCEDURE
The original plan for the experiment was to add assertions, put in
errors, and execute the autopilot code on the flight control computers
installed at the Digital Flight Control Systems Verification Laboratory
at NASA-AMES [de Feo 82]. This was tried, but it proved to be more
efficient to rewrite the program and execute it on another computer.
The reasons for this are as follows: Developing assertions involves a
certain amount of experimentation in order to refine them and measure
the desired condition. In addition, the errors were to be seeded one at
a time so it would be possible to determine whether or not a particular
error had been detected. Each change in the code, for refinement of
assertions or inserting an error, required recompilation of the entire
program by an AED compiler which was on a Univac computer at a different
location. Then the excutable code had to be downloaded into the flight
computers on the pallet. It soon became apparent that the process of
making changes to the code was so time consuming that very fews runs
could be made in one day. For this reason, the code was rewritten in
Pascal so it could be executed more efficiently on the DEC-20 at the
Stanford University campus.
There were two other even more important reasons for moving the
code to another computer. One was that introducing errors into the code
often caused the flight computers installed on the pallet to "crash" (or
not fly at all) because the effect of the error was so drastic.
Consequently, the section of code containing assertions was never
executed. The other reason was intrinsic to the nature of the flight
computers which have a dual-dual redundancy architecture. Aberrations
are corrected by voters and limiters built into the software [de Feo
82], so errors introduced in the software running on one channel would
be "corrected" by the voters or limiters before detection by an
assertion.
In this experiment, the assertions were written by one person and
the errors by another person. The reason for doing this was to maintain
complete independence. Since existing documentation did not contain
enough information to write assertions, the flight computers were run on
the simulator in conjunction with a strip chart recording device to
determine the normal values of the program variables. From this
information, it was possible to write assertions for the set of modules
to be tested. More detailed information may be found in the following:
a description of the experiment to test flight software with assertions
[Mahmood 84c]; suggestions for writing assertions in flight software
gained from this experience [Mahmood 84a]. A combination of these two
papers along with additional information was published as a technical
report of the Center for Reliable Computing at Stanford University
[Mahmood 84b].
The selection of errors was taken from two studies of errors made
during implementation of flight control software [Hecht 82]; one was
similar to the software used as a test case. Errors, chosen "from four
different classifications, were seeded one at a time in the software to
determine the effectiveness of assertions in finding errors of different
types. An effort was made to duplicate exactly the errors from the
study whenever possible.
r
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4 ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH RESULTS
This research study can be divided into three phases: the first was
the original software testing on the flight simulators installed at the
NASA-AMES Research Center; the second was conducting the tests on the
DEC-20 at Stanford University; and the third was a detailed analysis of
the factors affecting the effectiveness of the assertions themselves.
This section describes the results from each phase.
1.1 FLIGHT SIMULATOR TESTING
The results of the first phase, although inconclusive since few
tests were run on the flight simulator (because of the length of time
required to run each test), contributed greatly to understanding the
problems involved in testing real-time flight software. The first
results clearly showed that testing a software system with built-in
redundancy (that is, a fault tolerant system) is not possible using
normal testing techniques. These results also indicated that the same
problems encountered in testing fault tolerant hardware systems (fault
masking, etc) exist for testing fault tolerant software systems and that
"design for testability" features should be incorporated into fault-
tolerant software design specifications.
When the software was executed on flight computers in a simulated
real-time flight environment, the following characteristics of flight
11
software that contribute to the problems in testing fault-tolerant
software were identified:
* USE OF LIMITERS In the autopilot code, there is frequent use of
limiters which reset certain variables whose values are not within
certain limits. This is done, not only to control possible errors,
but also to keep the values of those variables within the limits of
passenger comfort and within the stress limits of the airplane
structure, etc. However, this use of limiters throughout the program
interferes with detection of errors during testing because errors
can be corrected by a limiter and therefore masked.
* USE OF VOTERS The values of input data, as well as the values of
variables from computations, are continually voted upon. If one of
the values does not agree with the others, the majority vote prevails.
Therefore, errors can be masked and difficult to detect, since propag-
ation of errors is halted.
* AUTOMATIC CHANNEL SYNCHRONIZATION The autopilot flight computers
have a dual-dual redundancy architecture with automatic synchron-
ization of the channels provided by the software. Under these
conditions, assertions which monitor timing do not catch errors
because timing problems are immediately corrected.
From these results, it was clear that it would be necessary to use
different methods in order to test fault-tolerant flight software.
Consequently, the software was tested as a single entity in a non-real-
r
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time environment in subsequent runs. In other words, the redundancy and
automatic channel synchronization had to be removed to be able to test
flight software effectively without error masking. This same method,
the disabling of redundancy, has been proposed for testing fault-
tolerant hardware.
4.2 SIMULATION ON DEC-20 COMPUTER
When the flight software was executed on the DEC-20, eighty one
errors were seeded (inserted) in the program one at a time to determine
the effectiveness of assertions in finding errors of different types.
The errors were from four different error classifications - data
handling, logic, database, and computational. As Table 4.1 shows,
nearly 70? of the errors were detected and, if the software had been
fully asserted, nearly 90/5 of the seeded errors would have been
detected. Assertions were put only in the part of the code executed
during the heading select mode. The software was not fully asserted
because some of the flight modes were not implemented on the flight
simulator and, therefore, not enough information was available to
simulate flight conditions for those modes correctly on the DEC-20. It
was, however, possible to determine manually which of the errors could
have been detected by assertions and which could not.
The errors (usually logic errors) that caused execution of the code
for which assertions had not been written were not detected. The reason
the remaining errors were not detected was frequently due to the fact
that they had no effect on the computations. For example, Boolean
13
variables (having values of either 0 or 1) are typically assigned a
value in flight software in statements such as, MODE = A or B or C and
not D. Suppose A equals 1, then an error resulting in a change in value
of B or C will have no effect on the outcome of this assignment
statement and therefore would not be detected by an assertion. In
another example, some errors changed the name of a Boolean variable into
another. When the value of the variables was identical, such an error
could not be detected.
Table 4.1 Types of Errors Detected by Assertions
ERROR
TYPE
DATA HANDLING
LOGIC
DATABASE
COMPUTATIONAL
TOTAL
NO.
INSERTED
22
19
19
21
61
X ERRORS
DETECTED
PARTIALLY
ASSERTED
63.6
47.3
78.9
76.1
66.6
FULLY
ASSERTED
90.9
04.2
94.7
80.9
87.6
4.3 OPTIMIZATION OF ASSERTION TESTING
After the experience in testing the flight control software,
efforts were directed toward answering questions about both the
qualitative and quantitative aspects of assertion testing. For example,
how should assertions be written, what type of assertions are the most
effective, where is the best placement for assertions, how many are
needed, etc.
4.3.1 Writing the Assertions
From the difficulty experienced in this experiment in trying to
write assertions with little knowledge of the program behavior and
inadequate software specifications, it is obvious that assertions should
be written in cooperation between a flight control analyst and the
system designer or the programmer who is implementing the code. Some of
the conditions that should be tested by assertions would only be known
by flight specialists; and for that reason, it is imperative to have
their help and guidance. The best time to add assertions is during the
original coding, so the assertions will detect errors during module, as
well as system integration testing.
4.3.2 Number of Assertions
The number of assertions depends on the phase of testing. When
used for debugging, assertions should be embedded frequently throughout
flight software code so they can point to the location of the errors.
The suggested procedure is to seed the program with errors (as was done
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in this experiment) and then retain a covering set of assertions, that
is, the set detecting all seeded errors. Once the software is ready for
testing in a flight simulation environment, then fewer assertions can be
used so that memory space in the computer and execution time overhead
are minimized.
When assertions are used for error detection in implementation of
fault tolerance techniques, minimization of assertions (and the
consequent overhead) is also important. The assumption would be that
those assertions shown to be effective in error detection during the
testing phase would be most able to detect intermittent and transient
hardware faults, as well as any new software errors that might be
introduced during maintainance.
Nineteen assertions were added to the software during the second
phase of the experiment. Table 4.2 shows the number of errors detected
by each of those assertions. Most errors were detected by more than one
assertion. However, three errors were detected only by assertion number
nineteen and a fourth error was detected only by assertion number
seveteen. These two assertions constitute the set of "essential" or
"critical" assertions if those four errors are to be detected. These
two assertions also detected other errors. The remaining errors could
be detected by either assertion number ten or fifteen. This means that
out of all the assertions written, three assertions could be used to
detect all the detectable errors. The implication of these results is
that it may be possible to find a small subset of assertions capable of
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detecting a large number of errors, so space and time overhead can be
minimal. This result makes assertion testing even more attractive.
Table 4.2
Number of Errors Detected by Each Assertion
Assertion # // Errors Detected
1 5
2 6
3 14
4 20
5 3
6 6
7 15
8 16
9 41
10 40
11 6
12 30
13 0
14 27
15 44
16 41
17 13
18 36
19 11
17
M.3.3 Placement of Assertions
The placement of the assertions is also dependent on the testing
phase. During the early debugging phase, it is most desirable to have
many assertions to check incoming data, outgoing commands, data storage
and retrieval, and the results of computations. The analysis showed
that the effective and essential assertions were in the last part of the
asserted code (the procedures that calculate the final commands to the
ailerons). This is not surprising since assertions placed earlier in
the code would not catch errors introduced later on. Although the
results of the first phase of the experiment showed that many of the
seeded errors would be corrected by the voters built into the software,
the results of the second phase demonstrated that assertions can detect
those errors when the software system1" is tested as a single entity (with
the redundancy disabled). In the testing phases where execution time
and computer space are important, assertions should be placed in the
procedures that calculate commands to the mechanical parts of a flight
system.
4.3.4 Choice of Assertions
Assertions can be different types. They can measure the
relationship between variables, check for maximum or minimum allowable
values of a variable, or perform a numerical computation with a
different algorithm to determine correctness of the calculation.
Examples of each of these types of assertions were given in Sec. 2.
Assertions also can have tests for more than one variable, and a factor
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for time may also be included in the assertion. All types of assertions
were written for this experiment and, interestly enough, none of these
factors - type of assertion, inclusion of a factor for time, or checking
multiple variables - seemed to affect the ability of the assertion to
detect errors.
Further in-depth analysis did reveal a factor that appears to
influence the effectiveness and criticality of an assertion. It seemed
possible that testing certain variables might be more effective than
testing others - depending on which variables provide greater collateral
testing. One measure of collateral testing is the number of variables
that are utilized in assigning a value to a variable. This number is
refered to as the "data dependency" of that variable. The variables
with the highest "data dependencies," therefore, would be expected to
provide the greatest collateral testing of other variables.
This hypothesis was tested against the results from this
experiment. A high correlation was found between the data'dependency of
the variables tested in an assertion and the effectiveness of the
assertion. Those assertions with the highest accumulated data
dependency factors (for the variables included in the assertion) proved
to be the most effective in detecting errors. The difference in
detection effectiveness was significant, since the assertions with high
dependency factors detected ten times as many errors as the assertions
with the lowest dependency factors. Not only did the most effective
assertions have the highest data dependency factor, but the two
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essential assertions also had very high dependency factors.
Therefore, to ensure that the greatest number of variables are
directly or indirectly tested, the dependency factor for each variable
should be calculated and the variables with the highest data dependency
number should be included in the assertions. This relationship between
assertion effectiveness and the data dependency factor of the variables
being tested should be of considerable help in writing good assertions
for flight software.
5 CONCLUSION
Initial test runs on flight computers installed on a flight
simulator at NASA-AMES revealed major differences between real-time
flight software and non-real-time software. More comprehensive testing
done in the second testing phase indicated that, regardless of these
differences, assertion testing is an effective method for detecting
errors in flight control software. A major implication of this result
is that assertion testing may be able to eliminate most errors at an
earlier stage in the development cycle than before, thus reducing
testing costs.
Therefore it is proposed that assertions be added to the software
during implementation and that assertion testing be utilized from the
beginning to shorten the testing cycle. Furthermore, in fault-tolerant
computing applications, the suggested procedure is to retain the
assertions during deployment and include additional code to provide
error recovery. One of the conclusions reached as a result of this
20
experiment is that the number of assertions required to detect all
possible detectable errors may be a small, minimal set - therefore
making assertions a useful medium for providing fault tolerance in
flight software.
According to these test results, effectiveness of an assertion was
not affected by factors such as checking multiple variables, inclusion
of a factor for time, or type of assertion. However, testing program
parameters that provided the greatest collateral testing of other
parameters improved the effectiveness of an assertion.
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